



U.S. Department of Justice
Drug Enforcement Administration
FOI/Records Management Section
8701 Morrisette Drive
Springfield, Virginia 22152

NOV 13 2018

Case Number: 18-00373-F

Subject: Any and all data relating to Super Bowl LII collected by DEA Headquarters and any DEA field offices for the years 2017 and 2018

MuckRock News
Dept. MR 49519
Melissa Hill
411A Highland Avenue
Somerville, Massachusetts 02144-2516

Dear Ms. Hill:

This letter responds to your Freedom of Information/Privacy Act request dated February 25, 2018, addressed to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit, seeking access to information regarding the above subject.

By letter dated May 7, 2018, we informed you that the DEA was referring certain files to another agency and that they would notify you if additional material is available to you for release. That agency reviewed those files, and returned them to the DEA as a consultation. A review of the processing of that information is now complete and the 31 pages are being released to you.

The processing of your request identified certain materials that will be released to you. Portions not released are being withheld pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552, and/or the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. Please refer to the list enclosed with this letter that identifies the authority for withholding the deleted material, which is indicated by a mark appearing in the block next to the exemption. An additional enclosure with this letter explains these exemptions in more detail. The documents are being forwarded to you with this letter.

The rules and regulations of the DEA applicable to FOIA requests are contained in the Code of Federal Regulations, Title 28, Part 16, as amended. They are published in the Federal Register and are available for inspection by members of the public.

For your information, Congress excluded three discrete categories of law enforcement and national security records from the requirements of the FOIA. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 552(c). This response is limited to those records that are subject to the requirements of the FOIA. This is a standard notification that is given to all our requesters and should not be taken as an indication that excluded records do, or do not, exist.

You may contact our FOIA Public Liaison at 202-307-7596 for any further assistance and to discuss any aspect of your request. Additionally, you may contact the Office of Government Information Services (OGIS) at the National Archives and Records Administration to inquire about the FOIA mediation services they offer. The contact information for OGIS is as follows: Office of Government Information Services, National Archives and Records Administration, Room 2510, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, Maryland 20740-6001; e-mail at ogis@nara.gov; telephone at 202-741-5770; toll free at 1-877-684-6448; or facsimile at 202-741-5769.

If you are not satisfied with my response to this request, you may administratively appeal by writing to the Director, Office of Information Policy (OIP), United States Department of Justice, Suite 11050, 1425 New York Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20530-0001, or you may submit an appeal through OIP's FOIAonline portal by creating an account on the following web site: <https://www.foiaonline.gov/foiaonline/action/public/home>. Your appeal must be postmarked or electronically transmitted within 90 days of the date of my response to your request. If you submit your appeal by mail, both the letter and the envelope should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

If you have any questions regarding this letter, you may contact Government Information Specialist J. Kewley at 202-307-7728.

Sincerely,



Katherine L. Myrick, Chief
Freedom of Information/Privacy Act Unit
FOI/Records Management Section

Number of pages released: 31

APPLICABLE SECTIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND/OR PRIVACY ACT:

Freedom of Information Act 5 U.S.C. 552			Privacy Act 5 U.S.C. 552a	
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(5)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(C)	<input type="checkbox"/> (d)(5)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(2)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(2)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(6)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(D)	<input type="checkbox"/> (j)(2)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(5)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(3)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(A)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(E)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(1)	<input type="checkbox"/> (k)(6)
<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(4)	<input type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(B)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> (b)(7)(F)		

Enclosures

EXPLANATION OF EXEMPTIONS
SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552

- (b)(1) (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order;
- (b)(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an agency;
- (b)(3) specifically exempted from disclosure by statute (other than section 552b of this title), if that statute-
- (A)(i) requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue; or (ii) establishes particular criteria for withholding or refers to particular types of matters to be withheld; and (B) if enacted after the date of enactment of the OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, specifically cites to this paragraph.
- (b)(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential;
- (b)(5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency;
- (b)(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
- (b)(7) records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, (B) would deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, (D) could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source, including a State, local, or foreign agency or authority or any private institution which furnished information on a confidential basis, and, in the case of a record or information compiled by criminal law enforcement authority in the course of a criminal investigation or by an agency conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation, information furnished by a confidential source, (E) would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law, or (F) could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual;
- (b)(8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or
- (b)(9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning wells.

SUBSECTIONS OF TITLE 5, UNITED STATES CODE, SECTION 552a

- (d)(5) information compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action proceeding;
- (j)(2) material reporting investigative efforts pertaining to the enforcement of criminal law including efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or apprehend criminals;
- (k)(1) information which is currently and properly classified pursuant to an Executive order in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy, for example, information involving intelligence sources or methods;
- (k)(2) investigatory material compiled for law enforcement purposes, other than criminal, which did not result in loss of a right, benefit or privilege under Federal programs, or which would identify a source who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(3) material maintained in connection with providing protective services to the President of the United States or any other individual pursuant to the authority of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056;
- (k)(4) required by statute to be maintained and used solely as statistical records;
- (k)(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability, eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment or for access to classified information, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished information pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence;
- (k)(6) testing or examination material used to determine individual qualifications for appointment or promotion in Federal Government service the release of which would compromise the testing or examination process;
- (k)(7) material used to determine potential for promotion in the armed services, the disclosure of which would reveal the identity of the person who furnished the material pursuant to a promise that his/her identity would be held in confidence.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

From: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 5:53 PM
To: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)
Cc:
Subject: Re: DEA Support to SB 52

Copy all thanks bosses.

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)

On Jul 6, 2017, at 16:51, wrote:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)

I'm good with it so long as doesn't have an issue. I anticipate further requests for assistance as the event gets closer

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)

On Jul 6, 2017, at 4:47 PM, wrote:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)

I absolutely support the effort, as long as it meets the needs of the office (in other words, would be in a better position to support their enforcement groups and this new assignment?). I think is best placed to make that determination.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)

From:
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 4:43 PM
To:
Subject: Fwd: DEA Support to SB 52

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)

Are you guys cool with this?

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Begin forwarded message:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

From:
Date: July 6, 2017 at 15:05:57 CDT
To:
Cc:
Subject: DEA Support to SB 52

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)

Hi

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

I wanted to do an "introduction" to one of my contacts.

Could we please include him on future Super Bowl meetings, at least on the criminal side of

the house? DEA is going to have a much better picture of the drug threat (and all other threats that come with drug trafficking), than I likely will as we approach the Super Bowl. Additionally, they have a robust source base that may assist us with RFIs as we get closer.

Thanks [REDACTED]!

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

[REDACTED] is one of our high speed IAs that has the daunting task of being an intel ring leader for the Super Bowl.)

IA [REDACTED]
Minneapolis Field Office
Squads I-3/C-1
Safe Streets Task Force

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

[REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 23, 2018 4:44 PM
To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] (b)(7)(C)
[REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C); (b)(7)(F)
[REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Subject: Hot off the Presses
Attachments: 2FINAL_FBI_UNCLASS_SUPERBOWL52.pdf
Follow Up Flag: Flag for follow up (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Flag Status: Flagged

Good Afternoon,

It's finally here! The unclassified version of the JSETA is attached. This version can be shared with trusted private sector partners. [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) If you do not have access to that, please send me your email address for classified systems, and I can send it to you.

Thank you to all of you who participated in the Analyst working group. It has been a pleasure to work with all of you.

[REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Intelligence Analyst (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
FBI Minneapolis
[REDACTED]

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

From:

Sent:

To:

Subject:

Wednesday, August 16, 2017 1:17 PM

RE: DEA Support to SB 52

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Sounds great! I'll be in DC September 10-23 for cyber training, but am free on either end of that. I've been meaning to touch base with [REDACTED] at MOA too, maybe we could coordinate a lunch or something next week or the week after to all sit down and collaborate?

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

DEA Minneapolis – St. Paul

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Message-----

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

From:

Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2017 12:13 PM

To:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Subject: RE: DEA Support to SB 52

Absolutely. I can also meet with you to go over what we've discussed so far, Just let me know.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (DEA) [mailto:[REDACTED]]

Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2017 12:08 PM

To:

Cc:

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Subject: RE: DEA Support to SB 52

Oh, bummer! I've got a meeting with our building's security team at 1230 today. Maybe I can catch the next one?

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2017 11:09 AM

To: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Cc: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Subject: RE: DEA Support to SB 52 (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Yes, my apologies, I thought I'd sent an invitation to you. The meeting is today at 1 at the FBI Office in Brooklyn Center.

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2017 11:07 AM

To: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Cc: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Subject: RE: DEA Support to SB 52

Hey guys, this still happening?

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Sent: Friday, July 07, 2017 8:36 AM

To: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

Cc: (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Subject: RE: DEA Support to SB 52

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

We'd welcome your addition to the SB 52 Analyst Working Group. Our next meeting will be in mid-August (the invite will be sent out soon) at the FBI office in Brooklyn Center. The main discussion will focus on cyber and WMD, however, the first part of the meeting will be a re-cap of our criminal threats, to which you can share DEA's perspective.

Regards,

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2017 6:31 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Cc: [REDACTED]
Subject: Re: DEA Support to SB 52

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Hey [REDACTED]

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Off the top of my head we've got DEA's databases/reporting and one of our Bloomington TFOs is an instructor for hotel interdiction. [REDACTED]

So yeah that's me selling it a little bit! This would be fun to be a part of.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)
(7)(F)

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(6);(b)
(7)(C)

> On Jul 6, 2017, at 15:05, [REDACTED]

>

> Hi [REDACTED]

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

>

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

> I wanted to do an "introduction" to one of my contacts, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Could we please include him on future Super Bowl meetings, at least on the criminal side of the house? DEA is going to have a much better picture of the drug threat (and all other threats that come with drug trafficking), than I likely will as we approach the Super Bowl. Additionally, they have a robust source base that may assist us with RFIs as we get closer.

>

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

> Thanks [REDACTED]

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

>

> [REDACTED] is one of our high speed IAs that has the daunting task of being an intel ring leader for the Super Bowl.) [REDACTED]

(b)(7)(B);(b)(7)(C)

>

> IA [REDACTED]

(b)(6);(b)(7)
(C)

- > Minneapolis Field Office
- > Squads I-3/C-1
- > Safe Streets Task Force

> [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 12:00 PM
To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Local/MN Fentanyl/Carfentanil Info

Oh well, haha. I'll ask my ASAC if he heard anything at the JTTF meeting or anything. I imagine some of our 1811s will be doled out to door duty or something but I haven't heard much. I know we're losing a lot of TFOs for it.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

DEA Minneapolis – St. Paul

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 10:59 AM
To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)
Subject: RE: Local/MN Fentanyl/Carfentanil Info

Ugh! I think we're getting into the final stretch of planning and things are getting finalized. Long story short, we had someone come into the division from DC and he took over the reins from [REDACTED] when he arrived. There may have been some disconnect there.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 10:55 AM
To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Subject: Re: Local/MN Fentanyl/Carfentanil Info

I wasn't asked, I think our ASAC has been in and out a lot so I'm not sure if it was brought to him or not. Would sure be neat though!

Sent from my iPhone

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

> On Jan 9, 2018, at 10:52, [REDACTED] wrote:
>

> Actually I think the SA who needs it has to submit the proposal by tomorrow. So although I'm not sure we'll have it in time, it would still be great information to have and would welcome it whenever it's approved for release.

>

> I would love to get together! What does your schedule look like? Also, did you ever secure a spot in our IOC for the Super Bowl?

>

> -----Original Message-----

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

> From: [REDACTED]

> Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 10:45 AM

> To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

> Subject: RE: Local/MN Fentanyl/Carfentanil Info

>

> So there's a report that I want to use, but it's still circling around the publications office for approval. Still need stuff?

>

> Also, we should all get together!

>

>

> ---

> [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

> DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul

> [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

>

> -----Original Message-----

> From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

> Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 12:18 PM

> To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

> Subject: RE: Local/MN Fentanyl/Carfentanil Info

>

> Thanks [REDACTED] I hadn't see the Sherburne Co Stuff yet.

>

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

> -----Original Message-----

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

> From: [REDACTED]

> Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 11:57 AM

> To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

> Subject: RE: Local/MN Fentanyl/Carfentanil Info

>

> Here's some officer safety stuff to get you started while I hunt around for other stuff.

>

> ---

> [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

> DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul

> [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

>
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

> -----Original Message-----

> From: [REDACTED]
> Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 11:09 AM
> To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
> Subject: RE: Local/MN Fentanyl/Carfentanil Info

> Yes, any stats on deaths/trends/seizures would be great. We're writing up a request for equipment for our task force officers when dealing with fentanyl/carfentanil and it would be nice to have some stats to bolster our request.

>
(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Thanks much!

> -----Original Message-----

> From: [REDACTED] (b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
> Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 9:58 AM
> To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
> Subject: Re: Local/MN Fentanyl/Carfentanil Info

> Deaths? Prices? Use trends? I'm sure I've got raw data on all the above somewhere/how.

> Sent from my iPhone

>> On Jan 4, 2018, at 16:04 [REDACTED] wrote:

>> Hi Friends,

>> Is anyone is aware of any products that deal with local Fentanyl and/or Carfentanil trends or stats? Local meaning MN but if you have info for ND or SD we'd be interested in that too.

>> Thanks much!

>> [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

>> IA [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

>> Minneapolis Field Office

>> Squads I-3/C-1

>> Safe Streets Task Force

>> [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 12:44 PM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

What about some time next week? I see what [REDACTED] are up to, too.

DEA Minneapolis – St. Paul

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:42 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Aww yay! Good for him, I'd like to meet the little peanut too

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:40 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

That would explain it! [REDACTED] took the whole month off to hang out with his new baby. He would probably like to come if we went anywhere, he'd probably bring the tot.

DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:38 AM
To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

Actually, not really ;-) I grew up in a household full of boys so I was engrained at a young age.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:33 AM
To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

Would it surprise you to learn that the crypto dark web nerd doesn't follow it very closely?

[REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul
[REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:32 AM
To: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

I know, but they've made it further than I thought they would this season. And this Packer backer CANNOT wait until they're taken down. They have to go down.

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:30 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Once last meeting (b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

I dunno, that would be some stars-aligning, Biblical, stuff.

[REDACTED] (b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)(7)(F)

DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)
(7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:29 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

Lord help us if the Vikings actually make it that far too. Go Saints!

(b)(6);(b)
(7)(C)-----Original Message-----

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);
(b)(7)(F)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:20 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

Oh yeah, I'm sure. I've been meaning to text him. All kinds of SBVII happenings in the skyway right now too, seeing boxes moving around all the time.

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)
(7)(F)

DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)
(7)(F)

(b)(6);(b)
(7)(C)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:18 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: Once last meeting

(b)(6);(b)(7)(C);(b)
(7)(F)

Poor [REDACTED] I bet his head is just spinning right now, with the MOA being such a large part of the Super Bowl activity.

(b)(6);(b)
(7)(C)-----Original Message-----

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(7)(F)

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Tuesday, January 09, 2018 11:14 AM
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: FW: Once last meeting

Yeah, looks like the counties, metro cities, DHS, ICE, Metro, and MOA, at the meeting. Would be a really good gig!

DEA Minneapolis - St. Paul

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(b)(7)(F)

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: Friday, January 05, 2018 4:20 PM
To: [REDACTED]

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(b)(7)(F)

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(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Subject: Once last meeting

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(b)(6);(b)(7)(C)

Good Afternoon,

Let's try to meet Tuesday January 16th in the afternoon. I'm thinking of doing a teleconference to maximize everyone's time. I'll provide more details early next week.

Have a great weekend everyone!

Intelligence Analyst
FBI Minneapolis

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JOINT SPECIAL EVENT THREAT ASSESSMENT



Super Bowl LII U.S. Bank Stadium,
Minneapolis, MN



Federal Bureau
of Investigation



Homeland
Security



National
Counterterrorism Center



Hennepin County
Sheriff's Office



Minneapolis Police
Department



Minnesota Fusion
Center

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(U) Super Bowl LII
U.S. Bank Stadium, Minneapolis, MN
23 January 2018

(U) Scope Note

(U//~~FOUO~~) This Joint Special Event Threat Assessment (JSETA) addresses threats to Super Bowl LII, taking place at U.S. Bank Stadium in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on 4 February 2018. This JSETA does not include nonviolent civil disobedience tactics (for example, protests without a permit), which are outside the scope of federal law enforcement jurisdiction.

(U//~~FOUO~~) This product is intended to support federal, state, local, tribal, and territorial government agencies and cleared private sector authorities in identifying priorities for protection and support measures regarding terrorism and other existing or emerging threats to homeland security. Information in this assessment is current and accurate as of 23 January 2018.

(U) Key Findings

(U//~~FOUO~~) As of 23 January 2018, the FBI, DHS, Minneapolis Police Department, Hennepin County Sheriff's Office, and Minnesota Fusion Center, with contributions from the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), have no information to indicate a specific, credible threat to or associated with Super Bowl LII or related events in Minneapolis and the greater Twin Cities area.

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
* (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and DHS define domestic extremists as individuals based and operating entirely within the United States or its territories without direction or inspiration from a foreign terrorist group or other foreign power who seek to further political or social goals, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.

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
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(U//~~FOUO~~) Several plots and attacks against or associated with large special-event venues overseas and in the United States between November 2015 and May 2017 demonstrate the continued interest by FTOs and other violent extremists in targeting these locations.



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
(U//~~FOUO~~) Although stringent security measures will be in place around Super Bowl LII and adjacent areas on the day of the game, Super Bowl LII and associated events remain a potentially attractive target.




- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 11 December 2017, an individual detonated a homemade explosive device that had been strapped to his body inside the New York Port Authority Bus Terminal, according to DOJ. Three commuters were injured during the attack. The suspect is awaiting trial.
- (U) On 22 May 2017, a suicide bomber detonated an IED in a publicly accessible foyer connecting Manchester Arena and the Victoria train station in Manchester, United Kingdom, as spectators departed a concert, killing 22 people and injuring at least 250 others, according to open source reporting citing the Manchester Police.
- (U) On 12 June 2016, a gunman killed 49 individuals and injured 53 others at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida, in one of the deadliest mass shootings in US history. The perpetrator wielded a semi-automatic rifle and a handgun before being killed in a gunfight with law enforcement. The perpetrator called 911 during the attack, pledged allegiance to ISIS, and referenced the 2013 Boston Marathon bombers, according to open source reporting.
- (U) On 13 November 2015, three suicide bombers attempted to enter the Stade de France in a northern suburb of Paris during a soccer game between France and Germany. After a security guard prevented one from entering the stadium, the bomber backed away from the entrance and detonated his suicide vest. Shortly after the first bombing, the second man detonated his suicide vest at a separate entrance gate. The third man subsequently detonated his vest approximately 430 yards from the stadium. The bombings at the stadium were part of a larger attack on Paris, according to open source reporting.

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


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^b (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and DHS define a lone offender as an individual motivated by one or more violent extremist ideologies who, operating alone, supports or engages in acts of violence in furtherance of that ideology or ideologies that may involve influence from a larger terrorist organization or a foreign actor.

^c (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and DHS define an HVE as a person of any citizenship who has lived or operated primarily in the United States or its territories who advocates, is engaged in, or is preparing to engage in, ideologically motivated terrorist activities (including providing material support to terrorism) in furtherance of political or social objectives promoted by a FTO but whose actions are independent of direction by a FTO. HVEs are distinct from traditional domestic terrorists who engage in unlawful acts of violence to intimidate civilian populations or attempt to influence domestic policy without direction from or influence from a foreign actor.

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- (U) On 31 October 2017, a US-based ISIS-inspired individual allegedly drove a rental truck through a pedestrian walkway and bicycle path in New York City, killing eight and injuring 12, according to the criminal complaint filed in the case and press reports citing law enforcement officials. Police arrested the suspect and found a note pledging allegiance to ISIS near the truck. The suspect is currently awaiting trial.
- (U) On 30 September 2017, an ISIS-inspired individual drove his vehicle into a traffic checkpoint near Commonwealth Stadium during a Canadian Football League game, striking a police officer and the officer's vehicle. The attacker then proceeded to stab the police officer repeatedly and later struck pedestrians with a rental truck after fleeing a separate police checkpoint, according to open source news reporting citing law enforcement officials. Police arrested the suspect and found an ISIS flag in his car.
- (U) In late November 2016, an attacker ran into pedestrians at The Ohio State University in Columbus, then exited his vehicle and attacked passersby with an edged weapon before being shot to death by a police officer, according to open source reporting. (b)(7)(E)

(U//~~FOUO~~) While we have no specific, credible threat reporting, we remain concerned

- (U) On 12 August 2017, a suspected white supremacist extremist^d attending a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, drove his car into a group of counter-protesters, killing one person, according to open source reporting.

(U) *Unmanned Aircraft System Concerns*


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(U//~~FOUO~~)

^d (U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and DHS define white supremacist extremists as individuals who seek, wholly or in part, through unlawful acts of force or violence, to support their belief in the intellectual and moral superiority of the white race over other races. The mere advocacy of political or social positions, political activism, use of strong rhetoric, or generalized philosophic embrace of violent tactics may not constitute extremism, and may be constitutionally protected.

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
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- (U//~~FOUO~~) On 26 November 2017, an individual used a UAS to distribute leaflets over spectators at a professional football game in Santa Clara, California. Later the same day, the operator of the UAS moved to Oakland to drop leaflets over another professional football game. No one was injured during the incidents. The operator was subsequently arrested, according to open source reporting citing law enforcement. Such activities reflect a potential tactic for the delivery of a weaponized payload.
 - (U) ISIS employed a small recreational-use UAS as an explosive delivery system in Iraq in early October 2016, according to a Department of Defense spokesperson. The UAS, which was recovered after being shot down by coalition forces, was transported to a nearby camp, where it exploded while being examined.

(U) *Cybersecurity Concerns*

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(U//~~FOUO~~) We assess criminal hacker groups or individual cyber criminals likely consider this special event an attractive target for short-term financial gain or other disruptions.



(U//~~FOUO~~)



- (U//~~FOUO~~) In January 2017, police in Washington, DC, discovered multiple disruptions to their surveillance cameras as a result of ransomware infections. Eight days before the Presidential Inauguration, hackers compromised 70 percent of the cameras across the city, which prevented officials from accessing the command and control center of the surveillance system. The infected cameras were configured with default remote access passwords, according to FBI reporting. Two suspects have been charged in the case.
- (U) In October 2016, a telephony denial of service attack to the 911 network impacted emergency call centers in the Phoenix, Arizona, metropolitan area. Several centers reported they were inundated with fake phone calls. As a result, authorities were in danger of losing service to their switches and operators had difficulty in distinguishing

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fake incoming calls from legitimate calls for service. Authorities arrested a US person for the cyber-attack, charged him with three counts of felony computer tampering, and sentenced him to three years' probation.

(U) Critical Infrastructure Concerns

(U//~~FOUO~~) The Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area is home to nearly three million people in seven counties and 182 communities served by a complex and diverse network of infrastructure sites representing all 16 critical infrastructure sectors.^e While we have no information to indicate Super Bowl LII is being targeted specifically, a man-made incident, technological accident, or natural disaster impacting lifeline sector facilities would have a potentially significant cascading impact on the event, the public safety infrastructure supporting the event, and citizens of Minnesota. Lifeline sectors in the context of this event are defined as energy, water, wastewater, telecommunications, transportation, information technology, and emergency services. However, it is also important to note impacts on critical infrastructure sectors in locations outside of the Twin Cities area could potentially impact the event based on the inherent interconnectivity of our nation's infrastructure.

(U) Weapons of Mass Destruction Concerns

(U//~~FOUO~~) We have no information to indicate a planned WMD attack—such as chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear—against Super Bowl LII or related events.

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^e (U) See Appendix A: DHS Critical Infrastructure Sectors

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(U) Criminal Concerns

(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and local partners assess high-profile large events can draw interest from malicious actors looking for targets of opportunity to perpetrate criminal schemes, including human trafficking. We assess there will likely be a surge in non-violent crimes, such as property theft, public intoxication, human trafficking, sales of illicit drugs, prostitution, or fraud schemes (such as hotel or rental frauds) due to the influx of visitors attending Super Bowl related festivities from 26 January through 4 February 2018. The Minneapolis Police Department reports that while violent crimes are rare during large special events, property crimes, especially theft, tend to increase. Crime rates for other types of criminal activity during large special events tend to be the same as during non-event times.

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- (U//~~FOUO~~) According to a recent assessment by the Human Smuggling and Trafficking Center (HSTC), 

Around the time of Super Bowl LI, in February 2017, three human traffickers were arrested and five adult trafficking victims were rescued during joint law enforcement operations.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Overall, crime rates for downtown Minneapolis are higher, especially for property theft, than the surrounding area. Statewide analysis indicates that during two recent high-profile events, criminal crime rates did not noticeably increase. Violent crime decreased during the reporting period^g, while property crimes rose. However, downtown Minneapolis saw a substantial increase in criminal activity, especially property theft, during the reporting period, according to law enforcement sources.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Other criminal activities that could affect Super Bowl LII include violations of intellectual property rights through the sale of counterfeit goods (e.g., tickets, clothing, bags, or other Super Bowl LII merchandise).

- (U) Prior to Super Bowl LI in Houston, Operation Team Player^h-related enforcement actions led by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) resulted in the seizure of over 260,000 counterfeit sports-related items worth over \$20 million, and led to the arrests of 56 individuals, with 50 convictions.

^g (U) Reporting period was 2003–2017.

^h (U) Operation Team Player is a year-round effort, developed by Homeland Security Investigations' National Intellectual Property Rights Coordination Center, which teams with the National Football League, US Customs and Border Protection, and local law enforcement in order to identify and disrupt operations to profit from counterfeit goods.

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(U//~~FOUO~~) The FBI and local partners remain concerned



(U) Event Overview

(U//~~FOUO~~) Super Bowl LII will occur on 4 February 2018 at U.S. Bank Stadium in Minneapolis, Minnesota. U.S. Bank Stadium is an indoor, fixed-roof structure, which will attract some 70,000 spectators on game day, and additional patrons are likely to participate in pre-game activities at tailgating sites and at local bars and restaurants near the stadium.

(U//~~FOUO~~) A number of major sanctioned events, including Super Bowl Live and the NFL Experience, as well as corporate-sponsored parties and concerts, will begin as early as 26 January 2018. These events will attract approximately one million visitors to venues throughout the Twin Cities area; an estimated 10,000 volunteers will also be on hand at these events. The city will be filled with a large number of employees of local businesses unrelated to Super Bowl LII activities as well. Multiple Super Bowl-related events are spread across the Twin Cities area, presenting a challenge to law enforcement and first responders due to public access, geographic dispersal, and the absence of secure perimeters.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) **Super Bowl Live:** This event will be held 26 January 2018 to 4 February 2018, on Nicollet Mall, from 6th street to 12th street, in Minneapolis. The event will be free and open to the public, with Peavey Plaza and Crystal Court serving as key locations. The number of visitors to this event could be as high as one million. The event features games, food, concerts, and other sponsored events throughout the entire 10-day run.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **NFL Experience:** This event will be held approximately two blocks from Super Bowl Live at the Minneapolis Convention Center, from 27 January 2018 through 4 February 2018. This is a ticketed event, which will offer NFL-themed interactive games, player autograph sessions, and other activities.
- (U//~~FOUO~~) **ESPN Media Center:** From 31 January 2018 through 4 February 2018, broadcasts of ESPN programs, including SportsCenter, will originate from Crystal Court on Nicollet Mall. This venue will serve as the main hub for ESPN's coverage of Super Bowl LII week, with television and radio content broadcasted from indoor studios. Many

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sports and entertainment celebrities are expected to make appearances during these broadcasts.

- (U//~~FOUO~~) **Mall of America (MOA):** The largest retail space in the contiguous United States is located approximately 11 miles south of downtown Minneapolis and U.S. Bank Stadium. The location houses over 520 retail spaces, 60 restaurants, numerous entertainment venues, an indoor amusement park, and two on-property hotels, with several other hotels in the immediate vicinity. Both participating teams in Super Bowl LII and key management personnel are expected to spend a significant amount of time on MOA property for the majority of events surrounding the Super Bowl, including game day. As a major tourist destination, MOA is expected to have much higher than normal foot traffic during Super Bowl week and on game day.

(U) [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E) (b)(7)(E)

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED]

(U) Potential Threat Indicators

(U//~~FOUO~~) Absent a specific, actionable threat to Super Bowl LII, we are providing indicators to aid law enforcement and first responders in identifying and mitigating threats. The totality of behavioral indicators and other relevant circumstances should be evaluated when considering any law enforcement response or action. (Note: Behaviors associated with the below indicators can include constitutionally protected activities. The FBI does not initiate any investigative activity based solely on the exercise of First Amendment activities or on the race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity of the subject, or a combination of only such factors.)

(U//~~FOUO~~) [REDACTED] (b)(7)(E)

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Possible indicators of other criminal activity include:

- (U//~~FOUO~~) Individuals or groups involved in trademark infringement; counterfeit goods such as tickets, clothing, or other game merchandise; or fraud schemes related to Super Bowl LII, such as hotel or rental scams; and
- (U//~~FOUO~~) Attempts to produce, store, or distribute trademark-infringing Super Bowl LII items or counterfeit goods.

(U//~~FOUO~~) Please report suspicious activities associated with any of the indicators listed above to the contact information below.

(U) Report Suspicious Activity

(U) The FBI encourages recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF). The FBI's Minneapolis Field Office can be reached at 763-569-8000.

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(U) Appendix A: DHS Critical Infrastructure Sectors

(U) There are 16 critical infrastructure sectors whose assets, systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof. Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD-21): Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience advances a national policy to strengthen and maintain secure, functioning, and resilient critical infrastructure. This directive supersedes Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7.

(U) PPD-21 identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors:

(U) **Chemical Sector:** DHS is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Chemical Sector.

(U) **Commercial Facilities Sector:** DHS is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Commercial Facilities Sector.

(U) **Communications Sector:** The Communications Sector is an integral component of the US economy, underlying the operations of all businesses, public safety organizations, and government. The DHS is the Sector-Specific Agency for the Communications Sector.

(U) **Critical Manufacturing Sector:** DHS is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Critical Manufacturing Sector.

(U) **Dams Sector:** DHS is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Dams Sector. The Dams Sector comprises dam projects, navigation locks, levees, hurricane barriers, mine tailings impoundments, and other similar water retention or control facilities.

(U) **Defense Industrial Base Sector:** The US Department of Defense is the Sector-Specific Agency for the Defense Industrial Base Sector. The Defense Industrial Base Sector enables research, development, design, production, delivery, and maintenance of military weapons systems, subsystems, and components or parts to meet US military requirements.

(U) **Emergency Services Sector:** DHS is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Emergency Services Sector. The sector provides a wide range of prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery services during both day-to-day operations and incident response.

(U) **Energy Sector:** The US energy infrastructure fuels the economy of the 21st century. The Department of Energy is the Sector-Specific Agency for the Energy Sector.

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- (U) **Financial Services Sector:** The Department of the Treasury is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Financial Services Sector.
- (U) **Food and Agriculture Sector:** The Department of Agriculture and the Department of Health and Human Services are designated as the co-Sector-Specific Agencies for the Food and Agriculture Sector.
- (U) **Government Facilities Sector:** DHS and the General Services Administration are designated as the Co-Sector-Specific Agencies for the Government Facilities Sector.
- (U) **Healthcare and Public Health Sector:** The Department of Health and Human Services is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Healthcare and Public Health Sector.
- (U) **Information Technology Sector:** DHS is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Information Technology Sector.
- (U) **Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector:** DHS is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector.
- (U) **Transportation Systems Sector:** DHS and the Department of Transportation are designated as the Co-Sector-Specific Agencies for the Transportation Systems Sector.
- (U) **Water and Wastewater Systems Sector:** The Environmental Protection Agency is designated as the Sector-Specific Agency for the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector.

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